Introduction
Most economists would agree that Europe does not constitute an Optimum Currency Area as defined by MUNDELL [1961] . With sticky prices and wages, a low mobility of labor, the nominal exchange rate allows member countries to correct transitory imbalances and to absorb idiosyncratic shocks. A fixed exchange rate, in these conditions, would impose unnecessary high costs of recession through reduction of output and unemployment.
Considering this problem, economists have paid increasing attention in the past few years to the role of federal fiscal policy in single currency areas, as a way to compensate for the lost exchange rate. Looking at the evidence from the United States, EICHENGREEN [1990] advocates a fiscal union or at least a stronger federal budget for the European Community, following an argument made originally by KENEN [1969] . Acting mechanically in a counter-cyclical way through a reduction in taxes and an increase in transfers, a federal fiscal policy could absorb part of the asymmetric shocks affecting regions, thus lessening effectively the downward adjustment in output and the rise in unemployment. This cross-country automatic stabilizer would insure member countries against idiosyncratic shocks.
However, this insurance aspect of federal fiscal policy may generate the wrong incentives for pressure groups trying to capture federal transfers. The argument, present informally since early discussions on European fiscal policy is developed formally in GOURINCHAS [1993] 1. In particular, it emphasizes the incentive problems associated with the labor market structure and the wage bargaining process.
The intuition underlying the analysis is straightforward. First, the wage bargaining process affects macroeconomic performance. By accepting more flexible wages, workers may reduce the likelihood of being unemployed should a negative shock occur and labor demand fall. Second, federal fiscal authorities may be unable to observe and monitor local wage negotiations, thus being unable to offer transfers contingent on the willingness of the parties to accommodate shocks. These two elements are sufficient to create a moral hazard problem: workers will try to capture federal transfers by hardening their bargaining position 2.
The spatial structure of the labor market determines the strength of this incentive problem. With fully decentralized negotiations, as in the US, competition between similar firms within the same region or country is 1. See MASSON and MELITZ [1990] and WYPLOSZ [1991] .
2. This problem is very general and can also arise between any region and the central government.
sufficient to eliminate the incentive problem. At the opposite end of the spectrum, that is, in the case of full centralization of labor negotiations at the federal level, workers do internalize that they cannot free-ride on one another. Again, they face the correct incentives. The worst possible structure lies somewhere in between: national/regional negotiations and national/regional transfers 3. Workers in a given country/region understand that they get identical wages and receive identical transfers. This congruence of interests makes rent seeking activities more likely. This situation would characterize a post monetary unification Europe with a strong federal budget 4.
The present paper builds upon this initial work by considering the issue of fiscal federalism. It has been argued that decentralization of fiscal policy solves all incentive problems, since it effectively insulates member countries. Local fiscal authorities can provide some insurance by running temporary deficit and surpluses. Using in this way their intertemporal stabilizer 5, the argument goes, there would be no need for a federal fiscal authority and this would eliminate the moral hazard problem. In light of the recommendations of the Delors Rapport and the Maastricht convergence criterion, which imposes a 3% ceiling on national deficits, it is interesting to know whether decentralization would achieve any efficiency gain, compared to centralization of fiscal policy.
This runs counter to a well established proposition in the early literature on fiscal federalism whereby the stabilization role of fiscal policy should be centralized 6. Decentralization creates fiscal externalities between competing local fiscal authorities, leading to inefficient decisions. If the bond market is imperfect -for instance if all countries in the federation face the same interest rate-, there is an incentive for local governments to run too large deficits and to capture an excessive share of the federation's savings '. Thus, decentralization might replace the moral hazard problem by a tragedy of the commons. 
The Model
The economy consists of two identical countries and lasts two periods.
All foreign variables will be starred. In each country, we have a continuum of identical workers on [0,1]. Each worker supplies inelastically one unit of labor in each period. There is a unique consumption good, produced in both countries. Labor is the unique factor of production.
The production function f (1,6) (resp. f(l*, E*) in the foreign country) is concave in labor 1. E and 6* represent i.i. where b represents bond demand by workers in the first period. A similar set of budget constraints holds for foreign workers.
Federal fiscal policy insures workers against bad productivity realizations, by tying their net wages to the foreign wages. This insurance component affects domestic and foreign workers' incentives to exert effort ex-ante. Intuitively, transfers reduce the income differential between the good and the bad states. Workers are less willing to accept a high effort since they can free-ride on their neighbors. In equilibrium however, this is likely to give an inefficiently low effort level in both countries. Workers fail to internalize the impact of their effort decision on foreign workers net wages.
The next section solves for the optimal efforts and tax rates when fiscal policy is fully centralized and workers do not have access to capital markets.
We then turn to the issue of decentralization.
Centralized Fiscal Policy
We assume in this section that workers have no access to capital markets and that fiscal policy is fully centralized. This is the strongest and simplest form of imperfection of the financial markets. No intertemporal smoothing is possible. Under these assumptions, the two periods are independent, the federal government runs a period by period balanced budget and workers must consume every period their net wage: ci = wi(l -ri) + zi. In the remaining of this section, we drop the time subscripts. These assumptions make a stronger case for a federal fiscal policy since workers have no instrument to smooth out wage fluctuations.
Centralized Negotiations and First Best
As is usual, we first characterize the optimal policy under cooperation. This corresponds to a shift in bargaining from the national to the federal level. Since both countries are ex-ante identical in each period, effort levels should be equal. Workers fully internalize the externality and choose ex-ante a common effort level. The optimal fiscal policy, freed from the hidden action problem, entails full insurance for each worker: r = 1 and z = (w + w*). Consequently, workers in both countries choose e to satisfy: Let start with the interpretation. Increasing r has two effects. First, by decreasing e and e*, it increases the probability of recession in both countries (first term) and decreases expected utility. This is the incentive effect. Second, it transfers income between countries (second term). This is the insurance effect. We define mn and en = B(Tr) respectively as the optimal tax rate and the associated optimal effort level -where the subscript n stands for Nash equilibrium. (9) is not satisfied when we have full insurance. From the concavity of the program, we know that the solution entails a lower tax rate.
(ii) with zero transfers, the two countries are independent. In particular, the first term vanishes, as the score vector is centered. But, by lemma 1 and lemma 3, from the appendix, we know that the marginal benefit is positive. Thus marginal benefit exceeds marginal cost and it is optimal to provid e some insurance.
(iii) as B' < 0, B(O) > B(Tn) = en where Tn > 0 is the second best tax rate.
Even though Tn is a Second Best policy (which means that it does better than the no-transfer policy in terms of expected utility), it does worse in terms of expected wages than no transfer at all.
From a macroeconomic point of view, these results shed some pessimistic light on the role of federal transfers as a shock absorbing device. Full insurance is suboptimal, and there is a clear trade-off between insurance and incentives. This, in itself, is hardly a new result, and the argument was often stated in informal terms 27. There are two immediate ways to circumvent the problem. First, the federal government could monitor wage negotiations. Apart from the already mentioned high cost of doing so, this would allow the Federal institutions to implement the First Best solution. The federal government could impose a common wage level in both countries thus 27 
Decentralized Fiscal Policy
Nevertheless, the transition to centralized bargaining is likely to take time. Meanwhile, incentive problems will be present. In order to eliminate them, it has been argued that member countries should be allowed to run temporary deficits and surpluses. This would allow them to absorb transitory imbalances through their own intertemporal stabilizer. This would also solve the moral hazard problem since workers' effort decision would be unaffected by their neighbors. In other words, decentralization seems to solve most problems associated with the loss of exchange rate as a policy instrument. The solution for this program satisfies:
(
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The solution satisfies proposition 2 -the proof is identical-: in equilibrium, the federal government will provide some, less than full, insurance. This implies the following result: It is important to emphasize what this last result tells us about the optimal fiscal structure of a monetary union. While Ricardian equivalence holds trivially when agents have perfect access to capital markets, proposition 5 provides a metric with which to evaluate the need for local government. In other words, local governments may be useful only if they can get access to financial liquidities on better terms than the constituencies they represent.
Conclusion
We have presented a model of moral hazard generated by the insurance component of a federal transfer scheme. These incentives effects are likely to depend heavily on the labor market structure. As a general result, familiar in the literature on insurance and incentives, it is not possible to achieve full insurance. We then investigated whether decentralized fiscal policy could achieve welfare gains. Local governments can borrow and lend in order to smooth consumption stream in their jurisdiction. The answer depends on the access to capital markets.
If agents can borrow and lend freely at the same rate as the local governments, local governments have are ineffective and irrelevant. On the contrary, when access to capital markets is imperfect, local governments may achieve welfare gains by stabilizing consumption streams and providing insurance beyond private access to capital market.
This may lead to a lower welfare if it induces a large drop in federal insurance. Moreover, this creates asymmetries between countries and is likely to reduce future welfare. More importantly, we show that it is never optimal to decentralize totally fiscal policy. The federation is always better off when a federal government offers some insurance to member countries.
Although our results suggest that local fiscal policy should be limited, it also implies that a large federal fiscal policy must be ready to absorb idiosyncratic shocks. In the absence of the latter, any restriction on the ability of countries to smooth income intertemporally effectively rules out any insurance. This is far from optimal.
It is evident that these results apply only to the insurance component of fiscal policy.
In particular, we ruled out any demand effect, coming from multiplier-like mechanisms. We also assumed that local government provide only insurance. There are some well-known arguments in favor of decentralization of the provision role of fiscal policy. However, the results presented infirm some presumptions regarding the benefits of decentralization in solving the incentive problem faced by the federal government. Federal fiscal policy is not the only way to cope with asymmetric shocks. Migration, by equalizing returns to labor in different countries, provide some cushioning. We leave to future work the task of investigating the relationship between federal transfers and migration. In particular, migration is a strong source of externalities. We suspect that a federal government trying to limit migration has no choice but to increase federal insurance, thus worsening the effort level in the federation.
APPENDIX
We start with a proof that higher effort level increases expected utility of consumption. 
